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The paper explores a structural account of propositional justification in terms of the notion of being in a 
position to know and negation. Combined with a non-normal logic for being in a position to know, the 
account allows for the derivation of plausible principles of justification. The account is neutral on whether 
justification is grounded in internally individuated mental states, and likewise on whether it is grounded 
in facts that are already accessible by introspection or reflection alone. To this extent, it is compatible 
both with internalism and with externalism about justification. Even so, the account allows for the proof 
of principles that are commonly conceived to depend on an internalist conception of justification. The 
account likewise coheres both with epistemic contextualism and with its rejection, and is compatible both 
with the knowledge-first approach and with its rejection. Despite its neutrality on these issues, the account 
makes propositional justification luminous and so is controversial. However, it proves quite resilient in 




This paper explores the prospects for a structural account of propositional justification. 
The account is structural in at least two respects. First, it helps to negotiate which 
formal principles govern this notion, using a limited set of axioms and rules. Secondly, 
it is largely silent on the issue of what grounds such justification, and so on what 
propositional justification materially consists in. In particular, the account is consistent 
both with internalism about justification and with its externalist opposition.  
 The account is furthermore neutral on the debate between epistemic contextualists 
and their invariantist opponents. It likewise coheres both with Williamson’s so-called 
knowledge-first approach and with its rejection. 
 The account elucidates justification in terms of the notion of being in a position to 
know and negation. Being factive, the notion of one’s being in a position to know is 
stronger than the notion of its merely being possible for one to know. The account thus 
differs from recent attempts to analyse justification in terms of the metaphysical 
possibility of knowing (Bird 2007; Ichikawa Jenkins 2014). 
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 It validates many intuitively plausible principles of justification as well as certain 
controversial ones, without compromising its neutrality on the aforementioned issues. 
Its initial motivation does not depend on any assumptions extraneous to the account 
itself. However, it makes propositional justification luminous, which conflicts with 
certain externalist views. Surprisingly, though, the account proves quite resilient in the 
light of recent anti-luminosity arguments. Accordingly, the jury is still out on whether it 
ultimately founders just because of its commitment to luminosity. 
 
1. Preliminaries 
1.1 Propositional vs doxastic justification 
The notion of justification to be elucidated in what follows is one of propositional 
rather than doxastic justification. There may be justification for  in a given situation, 
even if no belief in  is formed in that situation. By contrast, doxastic justification 
requires a justified belief. Uncontroversially, a justified belief in  requires that  itself 
be justified. Doxastic justification thus implies propositional justification, but not vice 
versa. 
 The relation between propositional and doxastic justification is often further 
characterized thus: x propositionally justifies  in a given situation, only if any belief in 
, based on x in that situation, is a justified belief.
1
 Plausibly, a belief is justified only if 
it is formed in non-question-begging ways. The alleged implication accordingly 
presupposes that one’s belief in , formed on the basis of propositional justification for 
, cannot itself add to the propositional justification that there is for . For, one’s belief 
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 See Turri (2010) for references. 
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in , based on itself, or on any of one’s own prior beliefs in , would be formed in 
question-begging ways (unless  is, say, the proposition that one believes something). 
 Plausibly, though, the fact that a competent subject comes to believe  on the basis 
of propositional justification for  in a given situation may add something to the 
propositional justification available for  in that situation. After all, the fact that a 
competent subject deems the justification for  sufficient for belief in  is a further 
datum that counts in ’s favour; and such a datum may make a difference. The 
necessary amendment is this: x propositionally justifies  in a given situation, only if 
any belief in , non-circularly based on x in that situation, is a justified belief. While 
others may non-circularly base their belief in  on one’s own belief in , one typically 
cannot do so oneself. 
1.2 Non-factive vs factive justification 
Propositional justification will be assumed to be non-factive, where this is to say that we 
cannot infer, from the fact that  is justified in a given situation, that  is true in that 
situation. In other words, where J is short for ‘is justified’, 
 
TJ J   
 
will fail. Failure of TJ is consistent with the idea that justification for  is sometimes 
grounded in factive states. Accordingly, for all that is here being assumed,  may be 
justified in one’s situation because one perceives  in that situation, where ‘one 
perceives ’ entails that  is true. 
 Internalism about justification comes in two basic varieties: mentalism and 
accessibilism (cf. Conee and Feldman 2001). According to mentalism, justification is 
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always fully grounded in, and hence supervenes upon, the subject’s internally 
individuated mental states. According to accessibilism, justification is always fully 
grounded in, and so supervenes upon, facts that are introspectively or reflectively 
accessible to the subject. On the intended conception of the relevant mental states, 
mentalism is often taken to imply accessibilism. (See, however, Conee and Feldman 
2001; Wedgwood 2002: 352.) The converse implication anyway fails, as basic logical 
truths are reflectively accessible; but arguably, very little besides internally individuated 
mental states is accessible by mere introspection. Internalism about knowledge then is 
the view that knowledge requires justification internalistically conceived.  
 Minimally characterized, externalism about justification is simply the denial of 
internalism about justification. After Gettier, even internalists concede that knowledge 
requires that certain external conditions be met. Externalism about knowledge thus is 
best construed as the denial of internalism about knowledge. 
 That propositional justification need not always be grounded in factive states is 
compatible with externalism as thus understood. Certain visible rock formations may 
justify the claim that there once was volcanic activity nearby, even if these formations 
did not result from volcanic eruptions but from some freak incident of an altogether 
different nature. Similarly, perceptible traces of slime on the pavement may justify the 
claim that the neighbourhood is infested with slugs, and yet on this occasion be the 
manifestations of an alien fungus. Neither rock formations nor slimy traces supervene 
upon internally individuated mental states, nor are they already accessible by reflection 






1.3 Justification as a prerequisite of being in a position to know 
It will be assumed that one’s being in a position to know  in a given situation requires 
that  be propositionally justified in that situation. If we let K be short for ‘one is in a 
position to know’ (rather than ‘one knows’), we can accordingly lay down 
 
K-J K  J 
 
Plausibly, to the extent that K-J holds, knowledge requires doxastic justification. One’s 
knowing  implies one’s being in a position to know . It likewise implies one’s 
believing . Doxastic justification implies propositional justification. It would be odd if 
one could not know  if  was not justified, and yet could know  even if one’s belief 
in  was not based on the justification that there is for . If one could know , although 
one ignored the propositional justification for  in forming one’s belief in , why would 
the existence of propositional justification for  be any precondition for one’s 
knowledge of ? 
 Proponents of Williamson’s knowledge-first approach should not, eo ipso, have any 
misgivings about K-J, even if propositional justification is here understood to be non-
factive. They are anyway happy to concede that one’s knowledge of  implies both that 
 is true and that one believes  (Williamson 2000). These concessions do not 
undermine their claim that, in the order of explanation, knowledge is both conceptually 
and metaphysically prior to any combinations of other epistemic notions that might be 
proffered in an attempt to analyse, or reduce, knowledge. To add K-J is not yet to add 
anything that would bring us any closer to such an analysis or reduction. Similarly, just 
as there is no pressure on the proponents of the knowledge-first approach to explain 
truth or belief in terms of knowledge, although knowledge implies truth and belief, there 
6 
 
would seem to be no pressure on them to explain justification in terms of knowledge, 
even if K-J holds.
2
  
 Proponents of the knowledge-first approach may still harbour doubts about whether 
any such notion of justification – a notion that would, moreover, be apt for explanatory 
work – is forthcoming. These doubts will be allayed in what follows. 
1.4 All-things-considered vs pro tanto justification 
Justification will be assumed to be justification all things considered. While there may 
be both pro tanto justification for  and pro tanto justification for ¬, it is ruled out that 
there is all-things-considered justification for both  and ¬. If the pro tanto reasons for 
 (¬) prevail, ¬ () is not justified overall. If the pro tanto reasons for  and ¬, 
respectively, are on a par, neither is justified overall. If there are no pro tanto reasons at 
all for either of  and ¬, again, neither is justified overall. In other words, it will be 
assumed that the following principle holds: 
 
DJ  J¬  ¬J 
 
DJ is not all that the notion of all-things-considered justification encodes. Reasons for 
¬ are not the only factors that, on balance, can outweigh or weaken the pro tanto 
reasons for , so as to preclude that  is justified overall. There may also be reasons for 
thinking that one’s pro tanto reasons for  are misbegotten or too weak (cf. Pollock and 
Cruz 1999; Bergmann 2005). Insofar as justification is here understood to be epistemic, 
all-things-considered justification for the thought that one is in no position to know  on 
the basis of one’s pro tanto reasons for , if any, should correspondingly be understood 
                                                 
2
 Given that the relevant notion of justification is epistemic, proponents of the knowledge-first approach 
may nonetheless be prone to looking for a reductive account of justification in terms of knowledge. Note, 
though, that the epistemic nature of justification may already be guaranteed by principles like K-J and 
others to be discussed below, where these principles need not conspire to yield a reductive account. 
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to undercut their power to bestow all-things-considered justification on . Accordingly, 
we lay down:  
 
(1) J¬K  ¬J 
 
It will be assumed that any structural account of non-factive propositional all-things-
considered justification must have the resources to vindicate (1), DJ and K-J. 
1.5 Desiderata for a structural account of justification 
The goal accordingly is to devise an account of justification that is propositional, non-
factive and all-things-considered and underwrites K-J, DJ and (1). These general features 
still allow for different precisifications of the notion, and the account to be devised 
offers only one such precisification. 
 Being structural, the account aims to be as neutral as possible on the question of 
which kinds of fact ground justification, and so on what it is that justification materially 
consists in. Given that K-J holds, it is therefore natural to lay down the following 
desideratum: 
 
[D1] The account should be compatible both with internalism and with externalism  
  about justification and knowledge. 
 
Recall that externalism was minimally characterised as the denial of internalism. As 
such it allows for different concretizations. [D1] should not be understood to demand 
that the account be consistent with all externalist views. To meet [D1], it will be enough 
if the account neither implies nor precludes that justification is fully grounded in 




 This observation matters, because the account will remain as faithful as possible to 
the job description that internalists commonly assign to justification, viz. that it make 
beliefs, appropriately formed on its basis, epistemically responsible. Not all externalist 
views will be concerned with this job description, which finding is consistent with the 
idea that there is such a notion available even to externalists. 
 Ever since its first detailed defence by Williamson (2000), the knowledge-first 
approach has gained a considerable number of supporters. Accordingly, in order to 
ensure that the account is of broad enough interest to epistemologists, we should accept 
the following: 
 
[D2] The account should be compatible both with the knowledge-first approach and  
  with rejection of that approach. 
 
These are not the only desiderata. The debate between contextualists and invariantists 
about knowledge is still unresolved.
3
 A structural account of justification should take no 
sides, but allow for implementation of the idea that the standards for knowledge vary 
from context to context; thus: 
 
[D3] The account should be compatible both with invariantism and with  
  contextualism about knowledge. 
 
As indicated, an account of justification, as this notion is here being understood, should 
have the resources to vindicate K-J, DJ and (1). But a structural account of justification 
should do more than this; thus: 
 
[D4] The account should license independently plausible principles of justification,  
  including K-J, DJ and (1), and help to decide controversies about others. 
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 Cf. e.g. Kornblith (2000); Hawthorne (2004); Wright (2005); DeRose (2009). 
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To fulfil [D4], the account of justification must be supplemented by a suitable logic. It 
may initially seem that, for this reason, we need to negotiate which principles of 
justification hold before the account is given, in which case the account itself does 
nothing to license them. However, as we shall see, the logic that needs to be in place is 
not a logic of justification, but a logic governing the notion of being in a position to 
know. Such a logic may be motivated on independent grounds. This is not to say that 
the account cannot help to motivate systematic extensions of this logic, for example 
because K-J, DJ and (1) must be validated in order not to miss the target. In the end, 
fulfilment of [D4] will have to be assessed on the basis of considerations of reflective 
equilibrium. 
 An account of justification requires initial motivation. It is not enough to show that it 
has nice consequences, as long as it is wildly implausible to start with. Such an initial 
motivation, or rationale, may have to appeal to certain principles of justification, 
however implicitly so. Since an initial rationale does not pretend to already be a 
justification, this need not render fulfilment of [D4] useless as a criterion of success. 
However, once backed by a suitable epistemic logic, the account should have the 
resources to sanction the principles, if any, on which its initial motivation depends; thus: 
 
[D5] The account should not rely, for its initial rationale, on any principles of  
  justification that it cannot be shown to imply. 
 
This completes our list of desiderata against which to assess the structural account of 
justification to be proposed. If the account can be shown to meet all of them, this is 
already a considerable feat. There may be further desiderata which the account proves to 
have trouble fulfilling. Whether there are any such further desiderata is left for future 
work to ascertain. 
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1.6 The notion of being in a position to know, and its logic 
Principle K-J already links justification to the notion of being in a position to know. As 
adumbrated, the background logic presupposed in what follows is a logic governing this 
notion. We therefore must clarify how this notion is to be understood and outline which 
axioms and rules it is, minimally, assumed to underwrite. Later, we will add to this 
axiomatic base in systematic ways. 
 Roughly, being in a position to know  is like knowing , but with the condition that 
 be believed systematically being replaced by the condition that one be physically and 
psychologically capable of believing . It already follows from this rough 
characterization that knowing implies being in a position to know, but not vice versa. 
Standard epistemic logics are logics governing the notion of knowledge. Since 
knowledge requires belief, these logics are typically bound to make strong assumptions 
about the psychology of subjects. Such assumptions are largely irrelevant to 
epistemology. A logic of being in a position to know, by contrast, abstracts from the 
doxastic states of subjects. 
 Given the aforementioned characterization, it likewise follows that one is only ever 
in a position to know what is the case. Thus, like knowledge but unlike justification, 
being in a position to know is factive. Again using K as short for ‘one is in a position to 
know’ (rather than ‘one knows’), we thus lay down: 
 
TK  K   
 
Accordingly, one’s being in a position to know  differs from its being possible for one 
to know . But it also differs from its being possible for one to know  where  is 
guaranteed to be an actual truth. For, unlike the latter, being in a position to know  
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implies that ’s being the case is ‘open to one’s view, unhidden, even if one does not 
yet see it’ (Williamson 2000: 95).
4
  
 Standard epistemic logics presuppose the rule of necessitation according to which all 
logical theorems are known (Hintikka 1962; cf. also Lenzen 1978). These logics 
likewise presuppose that if    is a logical theorem, then if  is known,  is known. 
The idealisations inherent in these rules are two-fold: not only are subjects said to have 
the resources to know what follows from what, they are furthermore said to be aware of 
what follows from what, using these resources. The logic for being in a position to 
know only makes the first kind of idealisation, leaving what is believed to one side. To 
this extent at least, it is less demanding. We thus lay down: 
 
RNK If |- , then |- K 
RMK If |-   , then |- K  K 
 
These rules still require extremely strong idealisations – an issue to which we will 
return in due course.  
 Standard epistemic logics are normal modal logics: they not only include RNK and 
RMK, but also 
 
KK  K(  )  (K  K) 
 
Accordingly, in standard epistemic logics, RMK is a derived rule. The logic for being in 
a position to know cannot be normal. To see this, reflect first that if we also had KK in 
addition to RNK, we could derive the principle according to which K agglomerates over 
conjunction, i.e. 
 
                                                 
4
 Accordingly, if there is beer in the fridge while you do not yet know this, then even if you could easily 
open the door and look inside, this alone does not yet put you in a position to know that there is beer in 
the fridge, for in your current situation this fact remains hidden. 
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  K & K  K( & ) 
 
Next note that where  is ‘No one ever knows ’, the conjunction  &  cannot 
possibly be known, given only that knowledge is factive and distributes over 
conjunction (Fitch 1963). Plausibly, if it is impossible for one to know a given 
proposition, one is not in a position to know that proposition either. But for all that, one 
may both be in a position to know  and be in a position to know . Just let  be a 
fleeting truth of little interest, e.g. that there are exactly seven blossoms on the 
bougainvillea, in a context where ‘the fact is open to one’s view, unhidden, even if one 
does not yet see it’ (Williamson 2000: 95), and one knows that a storm is about to hit, 
that one is presently the only one around, and also, by introspection, that one is far too 
unconcerned ever to form any belief about the matter (Heylen 2016; Rosenkranz 
2016a). 
 Failure of KK implies that the logic for K is non-normal. This inter alia means that 
we cannot give a standard Kripkean semantics for it. Something like a neighbourhood 
semantics is needed instead (Chellas 1980). This is not the place to devise such a 
semantics, though. 
 There are other principles, familiar from modal logic, that are bound to fail in the 
case of K. Among these are 
 
BK    K¬K¬ 
5K  ¬K  K¬K 
 
BK wrongly predicts that the truth of a proposition is always sufficient in order for one 
to be in a position to discard any claim to knowledge of its negation – which it evidently 
is not, since one’s evidence may be misleading. 5K wrongly predicts that whenever 
one’s evidence is misleading, one is in a position to know that it is. 
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 On any mildly externalist construal of being in a position to know, whether one is in 
that position may depend on environmental conditions, and as long as  does not entail 
that such conditions prevail, one may be in a position to know  without being in a 
position to know that one is in that position. The account to be proposed is meant to be 
neutral on the issue of whether externalism is true. Hence, the following principle 
should be resisted: 
 
4K  K  KK 
 
For the time being, we will only assume TK, RNK and RMK as part of the logic for K. 
Later we will consider an extension of this minimal base. It is understood to be a 
constraint on this extension that none of KK, BK, 5K and 4K becomes derivable in the 
process. However, since no formal semantics will here be provided, demonstration that 




As indicated, RNK and RMK require very strong idealisations. Subjects are assumed to 
be in a position to know each and every logical theorem, and likewise each and every 
logical consequence of what they are in a position to know. This inter alia implies that 
subjects are presumed to have all the conceptual resources necessary to grasp each and 
every proposition expressible in the language. To these idealisations we add yet another. 
 Thus, it will henceforth be assumed that subjects never fail to be in a position to 
know a given proposition already because they suffer from what would count as 
physical or psychological deficiencies, e.g. impairments of their sensory apparatus, lack 
                                                 
5
 As one of the referees for this journal has pointed out, there are fairly simple models of neighbourhood 
semantics in which all of the desired axioms and rules are valid, including one we will consider in §3.1, 
while each of KK, BK, 5K and 4K fails. Limitations of space preclude detailed discussion. 
14 
 
of intellectual sophistication, inattentiveness, drunkenness, madness, death, etc. They 
may still fail to be in that position for other reasons, e.g. because they lack relevant 
information, or because the prevailing circumstances are not knowledge-conducive, or 
because being in a position to know requires a safety margin, or because the proposition 
in question is false or structurally unknowable. 
 Idealisations do no harm, as long as they are flagged as idealisations. However, any 
such idealisation makes it harder to explain what relevance the resultant logic has for 
ordinary subjects (cf. Williamson 1993; Stalnaker 2006: 172). This is the kind of 
question we cannot address here. For present purposes, and with hindsight, it may 
suffice to point out that we are here ultimately interested in an account of propositional 
justification in terms of K. As long as we do not assume that whenever a given 
proposition is justified in one’s situation, one can easily avail oneself of this 
justification, irrespective of any further assumptions about one’s epistemic capacities, 
the idealisations inherent in the characterisation of K need not automatically render the 
account of propositional justification irrelevant for the case of less than ideal subjects. 
 
2. A structural account of justification 
2.1 Equivalence E 
The account of justification to be proposed is a combination of two theses. The first is: 
 
E1  J  ¬K¬K  
 
Here is an initial rationale for E1. If there is all-things-considered justification for  in 
one’s situation, then one cannot, in that situation, be in a position to know that this 
justification fails to have the right kind of pedigree or is obtained under unfavourable 
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conditions or is otherwise insufficient to underwrite one’s aspirations to know. For, in 
order for one to be in that position, there would have to be some information or some 
discernible feature of one’s epistemic situation that outbalanced or undermined the 
justification for , in which case the justification for  would not be justification all 
things considered (cf. Williamson 2000: 255-56; Smithies 2012c: 738). 
 This informal reasoning would seem to presuppose both K-J and (1). It remains to be 
seen whether these presuppositions can be redeemed, just as both [D4] and [D5] 
demand. 
 The second thesis is the converse of the first, i.e. 
 
E2   ¬K¬K  J  
 
We have already idealised away physical and psychological deficiencies, conceptual 
limitations and limitations on reasoning power. So E2 is not already refuted by trees, 
dogs, small infants, or madmen.
6
 To initially motivate E2, let us first ask what an 
epistemic situation must be like in which subjects, so idealised, are in no position to 
know that they are in no position to know . It cannot be a situation in which, if only 
one surveyed all the available information and was responsive to all the discernible 
features of one’s situation, one would come to know that they failed to provide  with 
sufficient support – which arguably would already be the case if all the available 
information and discernible features failed to bear on the matter at all or supported ¬ at 
                                                 
6
 The present account is not the first that seeks to characterize an epistemic phenomenon in purely 
negative terms. For example, Martin explores a disjunctivist view according to which ‘there is no more to 
the phenomenal character’ of visual hallucinations ‘than that of being indiscriminable from corresponding 
visual perceptions’ (Martin 2006: 369). For a discussion of the corresponding problem posed by beings 
with degraded epistemic powers, and of the role of idealizations in solving it, see Martin (2006: 373-87), 
Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006: 164-74) and Sturgeon (2006: 195-98). See also the ex negativo 
account of belief discussed in Lenzen (1979), Stalnaker (2006) and Halpern et al. (2009), which is 
structurally just like E and which we will briefly comment on in §4.1 below. 
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least as strongly as . What else, then, might block one’s path to knowing that one is in 
no position to know ? 
 Plausibly, some information must be available, or some feature of one’s situation 
must be discernible, that, whether it be knowledge-conferring or not, favours  all 
things considered – and does so to such a degree that knowledge that it is too weak a 
justification for , or lacks the right pedigree required for knowledge of , or is 
acquired under conditions that are not knowledge-conducive, etc. is foreclosed. Such 
information or feature constitutes all-things-considered justification for . 
 This informal reasoning would seem to presuppose the following principle: 
 
(2) ¬J  K¬J 
 
It remains to be seen whether the account ultimately sanctions (2), just as [D5] 
demands. It also remains to be seen whether its reliance on (2) makes the account 
vulnerable to principled objections. 
 Note that with E2 in place, K-J can immediately be established. By the factivity of K, 
i.e. TK, and contraposition, we have 
 
(3) K  ¬K¬K 
 
which latter, together with E2, yields K-J. With both (1) and E2 in place, we could also 
straightforwardly derive 
 
(4) J¬K  K¬K 
 
(4) has a certain plausibility. Even if J¬K is grounded in misleading information to the 
effect that the prevailing circumstances are not conducive to knowledge of , the mere 
availability of this misleading information is enough to put one in a position to know 
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that one is in no position to know . For the de facto misleading nature of the 
information is immaterial. One is anyway in a position to know, in its light, that one is 
not in a position to know , since its availability is already enough to put one in a 
position to know that there is no all-things-considered justification for . This line of 
reasoning, if cogent, also sucessfully undermines Smithies’ alleged counterexample to 
E2 (Smithies 2012b: 270). However, the reasoning still depends on the assumption of 
(2); and it remains to be seen whether this assumption can in the end be vindicated. 
 So far on the intuitive rationale for E1 and E2. They jointly yield the equivalence 
 
E  J  ¬K¬K  
 
Ultimately, the justification for E will depend on its power to fulfill the aforementioned 
desiderata, and in particular on its inferential potential, given a suitable logic for K. 
2.2 Fulfilling desiderata [D1] to [D3] 
E is silent on whether propositional justification supervenes upon the subject’s 
internally individuated mental states (mentalism). It is likewise silent on whether all 
factors relevant for propositional justification are already introspectively or reflectively 
accessible (accessibilism). E would thus seem neutral with respect to the controversy 
between internalists and externalists about knowledge and justification, thereby 
fulfilling desideratum [D1]. 
 Thus, according to E, subjects who are connected to the Matrix but are otherwise 
fully functional have justification for the claim that they have hands, since they are in no 
position to know that they are in no position to know that they have hands. The only 
facts accessible to them are facts that are accessible to them through introspection or 
reflection. Plausibly, therefore, the justification such subjects have available for the 
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claim that they have hands is grounded in such facts. Indeed, it is the induced inner 
appearance as of having hands that, in the absence of defeaters, stops them from being 
in a position to know that they are in no position to know that they have hands. 
 However, there is no pressure to conclude that the justification we have for the claim 
that we have hands is likewise grounded in introspectively or reflectively accessible 
facts, such as easily available inner appearances as of having hands. For, what stops us 
from being in a position to know that we are in no position to know that we have hands 
is that we are in a position to see that we have hands. Arguably, being in a position to 
see is a case of being in a position to know (cf. Williamson 2000: 34). Accordingly, 
given K-J, whenever one is in a position to see that one has hands, one has propositional 
justification for the claim that one has hands. Such a justification, grounded in seeing, is 
unavailable to subjects connected to the Matrix, but it is nonetheless available to us. 
 E is controversial. However, to the extent that propositional justification is what 
makes beliefs, appropriately formed on its basis, epistemically responsible (see §1.5), 
propositional justification, and its absence, should be something believers can in 
principle be responsive to and appreciate on occasion of forming their beliefs. Thus 
understood, E should seem less contentious, even to externalists. This is not to say that 
E coheres with all externalist views, e.g. ones according to which justification depends 
on objective features whose absence in a given situation cannot even empirically be 
ascertained in that situation. However, in the light of the minimal characterisation of 
externalism given in §1.2, compliance with [D1] does not require coherence with such 
views. 
 Although E is assumed to be a necessary equivalence, there is no presumption that it 
yields a conceptual or any other kind of reduction of justification. But E surely leaves 
room for such a reduction. If E is consistent with the reducibility of justification in 
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terms of K, it is a fortiori consistent with the knowledge-first approach. E is therefore 
compatible both with the knowledge-first approach and with its rejection. E thus fulfills 
desideratum [D2]. 
 E allows for, but does not entail, contextual variation in the standards for knowledge. 
It thus fulfills desideratum [D3]. In fact, E provides an explanation of why, if the 
standards for knowledge vary, so do the standards for justification. If it becomes easier 
to be in a position to know , because the standards for K are lowered, it becomes 
comparatively harder to be in a position to know that one is in no position to know , 
and so comparatively easier not to be in that position. Hence, given E, the standards for 
J are correspondingly lowered. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for a raising of 
standards. 
2.3 Towards fulfilling desiderata [D4] and [D5] 
We have already seen how K-J can be derived with the help of E and 
 
TK  K   
 
Besides TK, the minimal logic for K also comprises the two rules 
 
RNK If |- , then |- K 
RMK If |-   , then |- K  K 
 
Once E is added, the following two rules can accordingly be established: 
 
RNJ If |- , then |- J 
 
which straightforwardly follows from K-J and RNK, and 
 




  Proof: Let    be a theorem. Then by RMK, so is K  K. By contraposition and another  
  application of RMK, this yields K¬K  K¬K. By contraposition and E, J  J follows. 
 
With RMJ in place, we can now easily prove the following two highly plausible 
principles of justification: 
 
(5) J( & )  J & J 
(6) J  J(  ) 
 
The addition of E likewise allows us to prove all of the following: 
 
(7) ¬J( & ¬K) 
 
Proof: Given RMK, K distributes over conjunction. This together with TK entails ¬K( & ¬K), 
whence by RNK we derive K¬K( & ¬K). Given E, (7) follows. 
 
(8) ¬J(J & ¬) 
 
Proof: Assume for reductio K(J & ¬). By TK and E, ¬K¬K. By TK, ¬  ¬K. By RMK, 
K¬  K¬K. Hence by modus tollens, ¬K¬. From our assumption, by RMK, K¬ follows. 
Hence, ¬K(J & ¬) holds. By RNK, K¬K(J & ¬) follows. So by E, we obtain (8). 
 
(9) ¬J( & ¬J) 
 
Proof: Assume for reductio K( & ¬J). By TK, ¬J, and so by K-J, ¬K. By RMK from our 
assumption, K. Hence, ¬K( & ¬J) holds. By RNK, K¬K( & ¬J) follows. So by E, we 
obtain (9). 
 
This is good news, since (7) to (9) are eminently plausible (Smithies 2012a: 283-84).
7
 
 E explains why TJ should fail: J is not factive, because ¬K¬K is not factive. The 
axiomatic base for K includes none of KK, BK, 5K and 4K. E shows why BK and 5K are 
both bad. Given E, each of BK and 5K would make justification factive. E likewise 
shows why 4K is problematical, for given E, 4K would entail J  JK. Yet, the 
                                                 
7
 Smithies (2012a) suggests that we need to assume the characteristic S4 and S5 principles for J, in order 
to derive (8) and (9). The foregoing shows that, to this end, those principles are not needed. 
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justification for  may be altogether silent on whether the environmental conditions are 
conducive to knowing  on its basis.
8
 
 For all that, the account would so far seem to be incomplete, as we still need to 
derive all of the following 
 
DJ  J¬  ¬J 
(1) J¬K  ¬J 
(2) ¬J  K¬J 
 
In the next section, an extension of the minimal logic for K is considered and defended 
against objections. This extension allows for the derivation of (1), (2) and DJ. As we 
shall see, it also allows for the derivation of potentially more controversial principles of 
justification that are often taken to presuppose internalism. 
 
3. Justification as luminous 
3.1 The luminosity principle 
It was part of the initial characterisation of non-factive propositional all-things-
considered justification, given in §1, that 
 
(1) J¬K  ¬J 
 
holds. By E and contraposition, (1) is equivalent to 
 
Lum ¬K¬K  K¬K¬K 
 
In the context of a normal modal logic for K, Lum would define a class of Kripke 
frames with the following property: xyz (xRy & xRz  u(zRu & w(uRw  
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 Although this is ultimately of limited interest, since the logic for K is not 
normal, this observation might still help to clarify the import of Lum. Modulo E, Lum is 
in turn equivalent to 
 
(10) J  KJ 
 
Let us call a condition luminous just in case its obtaining, in one’s situation, guarantees 
that, in that situation, one is in a position to know that it obtains (cf. Williamson 2000). 
Accordingly, given E, Lum amounts to the claim that justification is luminous. In what 
follows, we investigate the option of adding Lum to the minimal logic for K. 
3.2 Fulfilment of desiderata [D1] to [D3] 
Addition of Lum does not affect the account’s neutrality with respect to the debate 
between internalists and externalists that [D1] demands. Lum is consistent with the idea 
that one’s propositional justification for the claim that one has hands is grounded in 
one’s seeing that one has hands, while one may nonetheless not be in a position to know 
that the environmental conditions are conducive to seeing. Even if justification is 
luminous, the grounds of justification may not be luminous. Just like subjects connected 
to the Matrix, one may be in a position to know ¬K¬K(One has hands), without being in 
a position to know that one sees that one has hands. 
 Again, this is not to say that addition of Lum can be made to cohere with any 
externalist view, e.g. one according to which justification depends on features whose 
presence in a given situation cannot even empirically be ascertained in that situation. 
However, in the light of the minimal characterisation of externalism given in §1.2, 
fulfilment of [D1] does not require coherence with such views. 
                                                 
9
 Here I am indebted to José Martínez and Fabrice Correia. 
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 Addition of Lum is likewise compatible both with the knowledge-first approach and 
with its rejection, just as [D2] demands. It is also compatible both with contextualism 
and with invariantism about knowledge, just as [D3] demands. 
3.3 Towards fulfilling desideratum [D4]: further proofs 
Adding Lum to TK, RNK, RMK and E allows us to derive DJ and a host of other 
principles of justification: 
DJ J¬  ¬J 
 
 Proof: By TK , contraposition and RMK, we obtain K  K¬K¬, whence by contraposition and 
 another application of RMK, we derive K¬K¬K¬  K¬K. By Lum, we have ¬K¬K¬  
 K¬K¬K¬. So by the transitivity of , ¬K¬K¬  K¬K follows. Given E, this is equivalent 
 to DJ. 
 
(11) JJ  J 
 
 Proof: By TK, we get K¬K  ¬K¬K¬K. By Lum, we obtain ¬K¬K¬K  K¬K¬K¬K. By 
 the transitivity of , K¬K  K¬K¬K¬K follows, whence by contraposition, we obtain 
 ¬K¬K¬K¬K  ¬K¬K. Given E, this is equivalent to (11). 
 
4J J  JJ 
 
 Proof: Assume J, i.e. given E, ¬K¬K, whence by Lum, K¬K¬K follows. Now assume for 
 reductio ¬JJ, i.e. given E, K¬K¬K¬K, whence by TK, ¬K¬K¬K follows. Contradiction! 
 Thus, 4J holds. 
 
(12) J¬J  ¬J 
 
 Proof: By K-J, contraposition and RMJ, we have J¬J  J¬K. Given E, Lum is equivalent to 
(1),  i.e. J¬K  ¬J. By the transitivity of , (12) follows. 
 
5J  ¬J  J¬J 
 
 Proof: By Lum, ¬K¬K  K¬K¬K, whence by contraposition, ¬K¬K¬K  K¬K. From 
 this, by RMK, we obtain K¬K¬K¬K  KK¬K, which by contraposition yields ¬KK¬K  
 ¬K¬K¬K¬K. From the latter, by E and (11), ¬KK¬K  ¬K¬K follows. Now assume ¬J, 
 i.e. given E, K¬K. Assume for reductio, ¬J¬J, i.e. given E, K¬KK¬K, whence by TK, 
 ¬KK¬K follows. By the foregoing, the latter yields ¬K¬K. Contradiction! Thus, 5J holds. 
 
Smithies (2012a: 296-99) argues that (11), (12), 4J and 5J are best explained by 
mentalist internalism. Their derivability from externalist-friendly premises shows that 
this contention is mistaken. Smithies would seem to rely on the questionable 
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assumption, rejected above, that if facts about justification are luminous, so must be 
their grounds, or on the equally questionable assumption that the luminosity of such 
facts requires these facts themselves to be already accessible by introspection or 
reflection alone.  
 There is no reason to expect that, after addition of Lum, the unwanted principles TJ, 
KK, BK, 5K and 4K suddenly become derivable. However, without a suitable formal 




3.4 Fulfilling desideratum [D5] 
With Lum in place, we can finally redeem the remaining presupposition underlying the 
initial rationale for E, i.e. 
 
(2) ¬J  K¬J 
 
 Proof: We have already proved (12), i.e. J¬J  ¬J. By RMK, we accordingly have KJ¬J  
 K¬J. By Lum and E, J¬J  KJ¬J. By the transitivity of , this yields J¬J  K¬J. Given 
 5J, (2) follows. 
 
Given (2), we accordingly now also have: 
 
(4) J¬K  K¬K 
 
Thus, the account fulfils desideratum [D5] and hence does not, by way of motivation, 
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 See footnote 5. 
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3.5 Margin-for-error principles 
However, Lum is controversial, as a cursory look into the recent epistemological 
literature confirms. Thus, consider what happens once we conjoin 
 
(10) J  KJ  
 
with the margin-for-error principle 
 
MK KJ  J    
 
where  and  are relevantly close cases that differ only marginally in whatever factors 
conspire to determine whether or not  is justified. It takes little to see that we obtain 
the soritical 
 
  J  J  
 
Hence MK puts pressure on Lum. Williamson (2000) derives margin-for-error principles 
for K from corresponding margin-for-error principles for knowledge. Let k be short for 
‘one knows’; then the principle corresponding to MK is 
 
Mk kJ  J  
 
where here, as before,  and  are relevantly close in that they differ only marginally in 
whatever factors conspire to determine whether or not  is justified. Principles like Mk 
are motivated by the idea that one’s knowledgeable belief must be safe, in the sense that 
there must be no easy possibility of one’s believing falsely. 
 However, unlike , K does not require that  be believed. In order to derive 
principles like MK from principles like Mk, Williamson (2000: 128) appeals to 




#  If one is in a position to know J in case , there is a case  such that, in , one 
  does know J and, in ,  is justified on the basis of the very same factors as in  
   – so that whatever cases are relevantly close to  are relevantly close to  and 
  vice versa. 
 
Friends of Lum accordingly have two main lines of response available: either they reject 
the margin-for-error principles for knowledge, i.e. Mk, or they reject #. Important work 
has already been done in pursuit of the first strategy (Berker 2008; Zardini 2012). Here, 
I intend to pursue the second and cast doubts on #. 
 Being in a position to know requires propositional justification but no justified belief. 
By contrast, knowledge requires doxastic justification, and hence a justified belief. J 
encodes propositional rather than doxastic justification. As argued in §1.1, a competent 
subject’s justified belief in  may add to the strength of the propositional justification 
that there is for  in a given situation. Let  be J. Given its commitment to (11), i.e. 
JJ  J, the account under scrutiny allows that a strengthening of the justification for 
J provides a strengthening of the justification for , as long as the latter is not already 
as strong as it can get (which close to the borderline it is not). Objections to a given 
account should not underestimate its resources. On the account under scrutiny, what is 
relevantly close to cases in which no justified belief in J is formed may accordingly 
not be relevantly close to cases in which such a justified belief is formed. Thus, unless 
MK can independently be motivated, we may reject it while still accepting Mk. Without 
MK, there is so far no argument against Lum. 
 Thus, for all that has been said, one may well be in a position to know the last case of 
J in a Sorites series for J, even if actually knowing what one thus is in a position to 
know would require that the last case of J was further along the series. ‘But if in the 
next case ¬J holds, doesn’t this block one’s path to knowing that J holds?’ Not if not 
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knowing what one is in a position to know blocks that path. One could push the last 
case of J further ahead by knowing, even if in fact one never does.
11
 
3.6 The unmarked clock 
Even if MK should fail for such reasons, there may still be margin-for-error principles 
governing K for  that do not attribute propositional justification. It remains to be seen 
whether this concession already puts pressure on Lum, quite independently from 
considerations of vagueness. To this end, consider Williamson’s case of an extremely 
accurate and precise clock with an unmarked dial and a single hour hand (Williamson 
2014). Let us assume with Williamson
12
 that for all relevant specifications  of what 
time it is, at time n, one is in a position to know  by looking at the unmarked clock, 
only if  holds at all times within the interval n  5min, i.e. 
 
MK  Kn  m , for all m  {n  5min} 
 
Let ‘t0’ abbreviate ‘the present time’ so that (t0 = n)n , for all n. Then MK entails 
 
(13) K(t0  {m  5min})n  n = m 
(14) ¬K(t0  m)n , for any m  {n  5min} 
 
For, if n  m, the proposition that the present time lies within the interval m  5min will 
not hold at all times within the interval n  5min; and trivially, the proposition that the 
present time is distinct from m does not hold at m. 
                                                 
11
 It would follow that one can never know all one is in a position to know. Let the superscript in 
‘necessary
i
’encode i-1 iterations of ‘necessary’. It would follow that Lum won’t be necessary
n
 for all n, if 
some ¬J-case in the series is not even possibly
m
 a J-case, for some m. For then it won’t hold that for 
every case x, every n and every possible
n
 circumstance in which one is in a position to know x to be a J-
case, where x is the last such case in the series, there is a possible
n+1
 circumstance in which one knows x 
to be a J-case and some case later than x is the last J-case. For all that, Lum might still be necessary. 
12
 Although he puts these points in terms of knowledge, certain passages suggest that Williamson intends 
them to likewise apply to K (e.g. Williamson 2014: 972). 
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 Again following Williamson, assume in addition that at time n, one is indeed in a 
position to know by looking that the present time lies within the interval n  5min, i.e. 
 
(15)  K(t0  {n  5min})n 
 
Let p be the proposition that the present time lies within the interval 4 o’clock  5min. 
From (13) and (15), we derive 
 
(16) Kp  It’s 4 o’clock 
 
Since the clock is extremely precise and accurate, there will be a huge number of 
possible pointer positions corresponding to times within the interval 4 o’clock  5min 
which, given (14), one is in no position to rule out as candidates for being present. 
Given suitable background assumptions, it follows that at 4 o’clock, it is almost certain 
on one’s evidence that it isn’t 4 o’clock. To the extent that (16) is known, it would seem 
that, at 4 o’clock, it is almost certain on one’s evidence that Kp is false. Since, 
plausibly, one cannot be in a position to know something whose falsity is almost certain 
on one’s evidence, at 4 o’clock, KKp fails, whence it would follow that Kp is not 
luminous (Williamson 2014: 979-81). 
 Even so, at 4 o’clock, it does not equally seem to be almost certain on one’s evidence 
that Jp is false. For given E, this would require that it then be almost certain on one’s 
evidence that one is in a position to know that one is in no position to know p – and so, 
given (16), that one is in a position to know conditions to prevail that prevail iff it isn’t 
4 o’clock. Such a diagnosis would seem entirely unwarranted. 
 This rejoinder might be thought too quick as an attempt to salvage Lum. To begin 
with, note that from the foregoing we can derive 
 




For, at any time m within the interval 4 o’clock  5min, 4 o’clock lies within the 
interval m  5min, and so by (14) is, for all one is in a position to know, present. 
Likewise, at any time m outside the interval 4 o’clock  5min, 4 o’clock lies outside the 
interval m  5min, and so by (15) and RMK, one is in a position to know it not to be 
present. 
 Let us now assume that one is in a position to know (17), and also in a position to 
know that one is in a position to know (16), i.e. K(17) & KK(16). Focusing on k rather 
than K, Williamson (2014: 973-79) assumes an epistemic logic that is normal. If we 
similarly had 
 
KK K(  )  (K  K) 
 
we could, by contraposition, infer from K(16) – and hence by TK, also from KK(16) – 
that the following holds: 
 
(18) ¬K¬Kp  ¬K¬(It’s 4 o’clock) 
 
Ex hypothesi, KK(16) holds. From this, by KK and RNK, we could now derive K(18). 
Together with (17), (18) yields 
 
(19) ¬K¬Kp  p 
 
Ex hypothesi, K(17) holds. Accordingly, by RMK, K(19) would follow. By another 
application of KK, we would obtain 
 




From (16), (19) and (20), by the transitivity of the conditional, Lum would then allow us 
to infer the absurd 
 
(21) p  It’s 4 o’clock. 
 
This argument against Lum not only assumes that one is in a position to know (17) and 
that one is in a position to know that one is in a position to know (16) – which may be 
contested – it also makes heavy-duty use of KK. We already know that KK is bound to 
fail (see §1.6) and so need not be overly impressed by this argument. 
 It might at first seem that this defence of Lum is ad hoc, because even if KK does not 
in general hold, certain of its instances may after all do. Yet, arguably, failure of KK in 
the present context has nothing in particular to do with Lum. Suppose that one is in a 
position to know (17). Given (16), KK would then imply 
 
(22) K¬K¬(It’s 4 o’clock)  It’s 4 o’clock  
 
But even at one minute past 4 o’clock, it may persistently seem to one that, for all one is 
in a position to tell by looking at the unmarked clock, it is 4 o’clock. Plausibly, it can be 
taken as known that as long as one enjoys such an appearance, with nothing to discount 
it, it blocks one’s path to knowing that it isn’t 4 o’clock. But then, by another 
application of KK, being in a position to know, at one minute past 4 o’clock, that one 
enjoys such an appearance, with nothing to discount it, should put one in a position to 
know that one is in no position to know that it isn’t 4 o’clock – which would contradict 






4. Why the logic for J cannot be normal 
4.1 Normality and the agglomeration of J over conjunction 
Before closing, let us consider whether the resultant logic for J can be a normal modal 
logic. This question is of more than merely technical interest, since the logic for J is 
normal just in case J agglomerates over conjunction; and the question whether J so 
agglomerates is undoubtedly of philosophical interest. Given RNJ, if we also had 
 
KJ J(  )  (J  J) 
 
the resultant logic for J would be normal. We next prove that KJ is equivalent to 
 
(23) J & J  J( & ) 
 
Proof: (i) Assume (23). Next assume J(  ) and J. By (23), the latter yield J( & (  )). 
By RMJ, we have J( & (  ))  J. Accordingly, KJ holds. (ii) Assume KJ. Next assume J 
and J. By RNJ, we have J(  (   & )). By two applications of KJ, J( & ) follows. 
Accordingly, (23) holds. 
 
By E and contraposition, (23) is in turn equivalent to 
 
Agg K¬K( & )  (¬K¬K  K¬K) 
 
Thus, the logic for J will be normal iff J agglomerates over conjunction iff Agg holds. In 
the context of a normal modal logic for K, Agg would define a class of Kripke frames 
with the following property: xy1y2(xRy1 & xRy2  y3(xRy3 & z(y3Rz  y1Rz & 
y2Rz))).
13
 Although this is ultimately of limited interest, since the logic for K is agreed 
not to be normal, this observation might still help to clarify the import of Agg. 
 Agg implies Lum, and hence its addition would make separate addition of Lum 
superfluous: 
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  Proof: Assume J and assume for reductio ¬KJ. From the latter, by E, J¬K follows. By Agg,  
  this together with the first assumption yields J( & ¬K) – which contradicts (7), i.e. 
  ¬J( & ¬K). Lum follows. 
 
Accordingly, by combining E with Agg, we could still derive DJ, 4J and 5J, as we did in 
§3.3, but would now have KJ in addition. Lenzen (1979), Stalnaker (2006) and Halpern 
et al. (2009) consider the principle B  ¬k¬ k, where B is short for ‘one believes’, 
and show that, once supplemented by this principle, normal epistemic logics for k 
stronger than S4 but weaker than S5 allow us to derive KD45 for B.
14
 The principle in 
question is structurally just like E. The foregoing shows that the same result can be 
obtained using a non-normal epistemic logic distinct from any logic that is at least as 
strong as S4. 
 The addition of Agg is, however, highly problematical; and ultimately, the logic for J 
cannot be normal, and J does not agglomerate over conjunction. This will be argued in 
the remainder. 
4.2 Lotteries and the preface 
Given E, Agg is equivalent to (23). Many critics point to the preface and lottery 
paradoxes in order to discredit (23). But given E, these criticisms would seem to misfire. 
First consider lotteries (Kyburg 1961: 197). Arguably, one is in a position to know that 
one is in no position to know that one’s ticket will lose. So given E, lotteries present no 
clear counterexamples to (23). 
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 In order to prove this result, these authors assume the epistemic logic S4.4, where 4.4k is 
  (¬k¬k  k). Jointly with B  ¬k¬k, 4.4k entails k  ( & B), which is highly implausible 
given Gettier cases. However, in this context, Lenzen (1979: 42) and Stalnaker (2006: 179-80) also 
consider the epistemic logic S4.2, where S4.2 results from S4 by adding Geach’s axiom. In the end, this 
is no better: as argued, given only the mildest forms of externalism about knowledge, S4 is too strong to 
serve as an epistemic logic. 
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 Next consider the preface paradox (Makinson 1965). Given E, for an author not to 
have justification for the conjunction of all the propositions composing her treatise, she 
must be in a position to know that she is in no position to know this conjunction. But 
how can past records of her fallibility put her in a position to know that she fails to 
know on this occasion? She would have to have an independent grip on how the relative 
frequency of falsehoods among the presently believed propositions compares to the 
relative frequency of falsehoods among the propositions believed in the past. Yet, she 
has no such independent grip. For all she is in a position to know, on this occasion she 
gets everything right (cf. Rosenkranz 2015: 637-38). 
 It thus is unclear whether, with E in place, the preface and lottery paradoxes provide 
counterexamples to (23). It is thus equally unclear whether they can serve to discredit 
Agg. 
4.3 Why J does not agglomerate over conjunction 
But Agg is bad for reasons that are independent from its equivalence to (23). Here is 
one such reason. Plausibly, K¬K( & No one ever knows ) holds. Yet, once both Agg 
and TK are assumed, it follows that K and K(No one ever knows ) cannot 
simultaneously hold – which, as already argued in §1.6, is highly implausible on the 
intended interpretation of K (Heylen 2016; Rosenkranz 2016a). 
 Here is another reason, related to vagueness.
15
 Plausibly, where  and  are adjacent 
cases in a Sorites series for J, 
 
  K¬K(J & ¬J) 
 
holds, whence by E and Agg we obtain 
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  JJ  ¬J¬J 
 
However, Agg implies Lum; and on the basis of Lum, we have already proved both 4J, 
i.e. J  JJ, and 5J, i.e. ¬J  J¬J. Hence, we can now once again derive the 
soritical 
 
  J  J  
 
Accordingly, Agg ultimately fails and so does KJ. Hence J does not agglomerate over 
conjunction, and just like the logic for K, the logic for J cannot be normal. 
 
Conclusion 
The proposed structural account of non-factive propositional all-things-considered 
justification comprises the following five principles governing the notion of being in a 
position to know: 
 
E  J  ¬K¬K 
TK  K   
RNK If |- , then |- K 
RMK If |-   , then |- K  K 
Lum ¬K¬K  K¬K¬K 
 
Given its commitment to RNK and RMK, the account involves hefty idealisations – 
idealisations which are, however, familiar from more standard epistemic logics. 
Embodying a non-normal logic for K, it yields a logic with D45 as the non-normal logic 
for J. The account is neutral on whether justification is fully grounded in internally 
individuated mental states or in facts that are already introspectively or reflectively 
accessible. Thus, it allows one’s justification to be grounded in externally individuated 
35 
 
mental states or features of one’s environment that are accessible only through outer 
sense. To this extent, it is open to both internalists and externalists. Even so, it provides 
a host of interesting principles of justification, of which some are often taken to 
presuppose internalist conceptions of what justification consists in. The account is 
likewise neutral on the debate between contextualists and invariantists about 
knowledge. It furthermore coheres both with the knowledge-first approach and with its 
rejection. As such, it should be of interest to epistemologists of different persuasion.  
 The account does, however, imply that justification is luminous, and so something 
that believers can be responsive to and appreciate when forming their beliefs. Its 
commitment to luminosity makes the account controversial. Yet, pending further 
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